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Professor Finkelstein's paper focuses on perhaps the most basic ques-
tion one could ask about the criminal law: What explains the existence of
the criminal category, as distinct from other kinds of mischief? Assuming
that society has good reason to deter mischievous conduct or to sanction
those responsible for it, we might still ask why either goal should require a
distinctively criminal category. The problem was brought to contemporary
prominence by Robert Nozick, who, in Anarchy, State and Utopia,'
asked: Why not simply compensate? If we begin with the (contestable)
premise that every kind of wrong that we might want to deter or to sanction
consists in a rights violation, then the question is, why don't we simply
have a scheme in which those who are the victims of rights violations
secure compensation from those who have wronged them? In the language
of the law, why not torts alone?
While a variety of plausible responses have been offered (beginning
with Nozick's own), the question poses a particularly acute challenge for
those who defend an economic analysis of the law. Since they seek to
explain the law in terms of a relatively narrow range of concepts, these
theorists find their explanatory resources correspondingly limited; they
cannot avail themselves of the most familiar philosophical solutions.
Roughly, they have proposed the following sort of account. We begin with
a system of property rights or entitlements; the justification for having any
such set of entitlements is to be conceived of in economic terms. For
example, ownership encourages investment and reduces uncertainty; for
those and other reasons, ownership is wealth enhancing or productive. The
degree to which a system of property ownership can be efficient is limited,
however, since having a right to something does not yet permit one to
alienate it. Without the right to alienate, individuals may be unable to make
mutually advantageous-and therefore efficient-exchanges. Thus, it is
desirable (in economic terms) to supplement the scheme of initial
Copyright © 2000 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Incorporated (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their
publications.
t Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence and Professor of Philosophy, Yale
Law School and Yale University. I would like to thank Eric Cavallero for his comments on previous
drafts and for his editorial assistance.
1. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 59 (1974).
HeinOnline  -- 88 Cal. L. Rev. 921 2000
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
entitlements with a system of "property rules." Property rules protect rights
by conferring on right-holders a power to alienate as they see fit, and to
guard against nonconsensual takings. The same economic considerations
that support a scheme of property entitlements mandate a system of prop-
erty rules.
Of course, sometimes the costs of transacting voluntarily are very
high, and a system of property rules in conjunction with a scheme of prop-
erty holdings may be inadequate to capture all the gains that might other-
wise be available. The classic problem is exemplified in the automobile-
driving context. Suppose each person is entitled to bodily security, and that
this basic entitlement is secured by a system of property rules. It follows
that while each individual is empowered to "exchange" this right to secu-
rity, any activity that might threaten it is precluded unless the actor has first
entered into the appropriate exchange relationship with the threatened
party. Since the person who is about to put the pedal to the metal cannot
know the identity of each and every individual whose security will be thus
placed at risk, the driver cannot in advance purchase the right to endanger
those other individuals. Thus it seems she would be precluded from ven-
turing beyond the garage.
The standard economic solution to this problem is to put a system of
so-called "liability rules" in place. Liability rules protect or secure an ini-
tial set of entitlements in a complex way. Those who would "take"-that
is, compel a transfer of-resources or entitlements are at liberty to do so;
but they are required to compensate those whose entitlements are thus in-
voluntarily reduced in value. Compensation should, in principle, be set to
offset the loss in value, so that the right-holder is no worse off ex post (that
is, after the taking plus the compensation) than she was ex ante (prior to
the taking). Liability rules thus allow individuals to secure gains which
they would otherwise be precluded from securing under the more restric-
tive regime of property rules alone. The same considerations that drive a
conmmitment to a scheme of property holdings thus warrant a system of
liability rules as well.
We can-roughly, but without too much violence to our concepts and
categories-think about property and liability rules as mapping onto our
practices of contract and tort. Together, these rules seem sufficient to cre-
ate and sustain an efficient allocation of resources. The problem then is to
explain why, from an economic standpoint, we would ever need a criminal
law. Proponents of a general economic analysis of law have offered three
related but different kinds of answers to this question. The most familiar is
Posner's. In his account, a criminal law is necessary to deter individuals
from pursuing nonmarket alternatives when a market solution is available
and feasible.2 For example, suppose I want your 1958 Les Paul gold top
2. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 165-66 (1972).
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guitar. There is no bar in principle to my seeking an exchange with you.
But suppose I am disinclined to negotiate for the purchase of your guitar,
and prefer instead simply to take it from you. A couple of factors might
lead me to act on this preference. First, it is not certain that I will be found
out as the taker of your property. Second, even if I am unable to avoid
detection, the probability of your winning a liability judgment against
me-though very high-is nevertheless less than one. Weighing these risks
against my desire to possess your guitar without paying for it, I may find it
advantageous to take it.
Evidently, some additional cost must be imposed upon me-
something that extends beyond compensatory damages alone-in order to
deter me from pursuing my strategy of taking rather than negotiating. Let
us call this other cost "punishment," and let us refer to my taking as a
"crime." We now have the ingredients for an explanation of the criminal
category. It is required so as to make available "kickers"-that is, addi-
tional costs that act as deterrents. These are necessary in order to prevent
individuals from pursuing nonmarket, "forced" transfers when the market
alternatives are available and feasible. We can express this familiar point in
the lingo of "property rules and liability rules" by saying that the criminal
law is necessary to prevent individuals from treating property rules as
liability rules: that is, from treating rights secured by a system of property
rules as if they were rights secured by a system of liability rules.3
Expanding on this explanation, Calabresi and Melamed have noted
that in the absence of a criminal law, some individuals might be inclined to
treat liability rules as if they were property rules4-which is an awkward
way of saying that individuals may sometimes have undesirable incentives
to treat rights secured by liability rules as if they were rights secured by
property rules. For example, suppose you live downstream from a polluter
and that you are entitled to compensation for the harm his pollution causes
you; your right to be free of pollution is protected by a liability rule. The
polluter may have an incentive to purchase that entitlement from you,
eliminating his risk of bearing higher costs should you successfully recover
under a liability-rule regime. The net effect of allowing such transactions,
however, may be too much pollution. In that case, we would want a crimi-
nal law not to deter him from treating a property rule as if it were a liability
3. We might think of punitive damages as alternative kinds of kickers. Note, however, that we
describe such damages as "punitive." Moreover, we want to reserve their use to special occasions,
because there may be perverse consequences of providing the victim of mischief with compensation in
excess of his actual losses. The criminal penalty imposes a cost on the injurer that is not thereby a gain
to the victim. And that is an important difference between punitive damage awards and criminal
sanctions.
4. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HAIv. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
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rule, but to discourage him from treating a liability rule as if it were a
property rule.
Alvin Klevorick provides what is perhaps the most sophisticated
treatment of the problem. He notes that it is not simply that a criminal law
is necessary to deter this or that action-whether it is an instance of treat-
ing a property rule as a liability rule or vice versa. Rather, the point of the
criminal law is to sustain and protect the scheme of property and liability
rules. Even if it were efficient in a particular case to allow such actions, it
is not generally so; and that is why we create a system of property and
liability rules. The point of the criminal law is not to deter a particular ac-
tor, but to sustain the "transaction structure"-the set of norms that deter-
mines the forms of legitimate holdings and transfers.'
Klevorick's point can be too easily missed by those wedded to an
economic approach. The purpose of the criminal law may be to protect the
transaction structure; but what makes actions that undermine that structure
criminal is the fact that in such cases the actor has illicitly taken upon him-
self a certain authority to determine the terms of legitimate transfer. The
criminal category is understood functionally, in terms of its role in sus-
taining the transaction structure, but the essence of criminality is under-
stood in terms of its moral/political character; what makes the conduct
criminal is that someone who violates the transaction structure has asserted
an authority that he does not possess. The power to set the terms of legiti-
mate transfer resides in the political sovereignty and not in ordinary folk.
Regardless of which variant one is considering, the economic
approach faces a range of insurmountable problems First, it trades on an
impossibly strained notion of what it could mean to protect a right. Prop-
erty rules are said to protect rights by conferring powers to alienate and
exclude; liability rules by providing for ex post compensation in the event
of a nonconsensual transfer; and inalienability rules (following Calabresi
and Melamed) by precluding an individual from transferring that to which
he is entitled. It would be difficult to overstate the perversity of this story.
Even if one believed that a system of property rules could be thought of as
a scheme for protecting rights, it is awfully hard to see how a liability rule
"protects" your right to X by giving someone else (everyone else, actually)
the privilege to take X from you without your consent-provided he or she
compensates you for the taking after the fact. This is just not the way the
notion of a right, or of protecting a right, is commonly understood. On a
more natural reading of the role of compensation in securing a system of
5. See Alvin K. Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, in CIMINAL JUSTICE: Nohios
XXVII 289, 301-04 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985).
6. I have long been at pains to point out the inadequacies of this approach, and must confess to a
certain puzzlement. While most defenders of the economic analysis of the law grant my objections (and
while none, so far as I know, has ever ventured a response to them) the economic analysis of the
criminal law continues to lumber forward-evidently impervious to the force of argument.
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rights, we would say that if you take X from me without my consent, then
you have violated a right of mine-or in other words, have acted wrongly
or unjustifiably towards me. Because you have acted wrongly towards me,
you owe me compensation. Compensation is what you owe me because
you wronged me; it is not something you pay in order to exercise a privi-
lege to disregard my rightful claims. If we are to understand liability rules
as the economic model suggests we do, then it is bizarre to speak of those
rules as a way of "protecting rights."
The problem runs deeper, though, for the manner in which the
economist conceptualizes the issue is confused, bordering on the incoher-
ent. If property and liability rules are instruments for protecting rights, then
how are we to think of the content of the rights that they are protecting? In
fact, property and liability rules are not ways of protecting rights at all;
these rules are norms that help to determine or specify the content of rights
with respect to the transactional domain. A property rule does not protect a
right whose content is otherwise specified; rather, it tells us that certain
rights include, as part of their content, certain terms of transfer-certain
powers and privileges, such as a power to exclude and to alienate on agree-
able terms. It is because a right is so constituted-that is, as having such
content-that it is appropriately protected in certain ways. It is because my
right to X gives me a power to alienate and exclude, when you take X with-
out my consent, I have a right to demand repair or seek injunctive relief?
The second major problem with the economic approach is that it
deeply mischaracterizes the nature of the criminal offense. Once again this
is a failing in the conceptualization of the problem. On the economic
analysis, all crimes are conceived as transaction-based. As Posner has it,
crimes are attempts to treat property rules as liability rules;8 in the
Calabresi-Melamed extension, crimes are attempts to treat one kind of
protective rule as if it were another kind of protective rule (protective, that
is, of the conditions or terms of transfer).' Finally, even in Klevorick's
much more sophisticated formulation, crimes are inappropriate assertions
of authority with respect to the domain of transfer or the transactional
structure. 10
This just begs the question. Once one thinks of the world in terms of
transactions, it is not surprising to find that one's explanation of the crimi-
nal law would be given in terms of transactions. The problem comes in the
initial formulation. Had one asked instead, what is distinctive about our
standard or paradigmatic examples of criminal conduct-murder, assault,
7. For a fuller discussion, see Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal
Rights, 95 YALE L.L 1335 (1986).
8. See POSNER, supra note 2.
9. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 4.
10. See Klevorick, supra note 5.
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battery, and rape, as well as theft-one might well have looked elsewhere
for an answer. It is impossible to take seriously the idea that the primary
failing in cases of murder, rape, or battery is transactional (though Judge
Posner has from time to time been prepared to offer up such an account)."
And while it is obvious that both Posner and Calabresi and Melamed are
committed to understanding the nature of crime in terms of failures to
abide by transactional rules, even Klevorick's more sophisticated version
of the argument understands crimes in terms of transactions, for on his
view the essence of crime is someone taking upon himself an authority to
set the terms of transfer when in fact he has no such authority. 2 In the end,
even Klevorick's argument fails-on two grounds. First, a crime is not a
kind of political action: a taking of political authority that one does not
have. After all, an intention to violate a rule is not thereby an intention to
assert authority or to deny the authority of others to determine the rules. 3
Second, though crimes are violations of rules, the rules that constitute the
criminal law extend far beyond the realm of transactions, nor are transac-
tional concerns at the core of our concept of criminal mischief.
Of course, to claim that economic analysis fails to provide a plausible
account of the criminal law is not to suggest that economic analysis is
without value. Quite the contrary. There is much to be said for determin-
ing, understanding, and evaluating the consequences of various legal rules.
The problem is that economic analysts continue to present their accounts as
explanations of various parts of the law, and as such they often fail. 4 This
is not to say that there might not be an economic account that could explain
why some hypothetical legal system might have a criminal category. I am
denying simply that the economist of law can give anything resembling a
plausible explanation of our criminal law. The argument I have offered has
focused on the inappropriateness of their conceptualization of the issues
given the limited resources available in the economic conceptual scheme
and the fixation on transactions as the core of the criminal offense.
Professor Finkelstein takes the economist of law to task along similar
lines, but her argument differs, in interesting ways, from the one I have
pressed. Where I have worked along with the economist-granting the
framework of analysis to which the economist is committed-only to show
that one cannot derive the desired explanation, Finkelstein begins by
defending the view that a certain mental state is central to our practices of
criminal law: Someone is liable for criminal mischief only if she
11. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 163.
12. See Klevorick, supra note 5.
13. To think otherwise is merely groundlessly to inflate criminality or mischief.
14. This is a problem that extends beyond the economic analysis of the criminal law; the same
problem arises in tort law. Whatever else it may be, economic analysis is not a plausible explanatory
account of either area of law. For further discussion, see JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF
PRINCIPLE: A DEFENSE OF THE PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY (forthcoming 2000).
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knowingly violated a prohibitory norm. Thus, while I have focused on the
nature of the norms whose violation is criminalized, Finkelstein focuses
her attention on the mental state that is necessary for the violation of any
such norm to count as a grounds for being liable to criminal sanction.
Finkelstein's argument is that while the mental state of "knowingly violat-
ing a prohibitory norm" is essential to our criminal category, the economist
is incapable of explaining the normative significance of that mental state.
From the point of view of reducing the level of criminal mischief, it is not
obvious what role the fact that someone knowingly violated a prohibitory
norm would play.
Roughly the same point was first made (to my knowledge) by H.L.A.
Hart, in conjunction with his discussion of utilitarian theories of excuses. 5
Utilitarianism is a kissing cousin of economic analysis; and in this context,
there is nothing that separates them. Hart quite rightly pointed out that
from a purely forward-looking or utilitarian perspective, the mental states
relevant to the criminal category are those that bear on whether a person is
deterrable, and not those that bear on responsibility as such. This seems to
be Professor Finkelstein's point as well. Whereas our actual criminal prac-
tice emphasizes the knowledge component-which itself appears to reflect
a concern for the agent's responsibility-economic analysis cannot explain
why knowledge is more appropriate to criminality than is inadvertence or
carelessness. Indeed, it is not obvious why any mental state that bears on
an agent's responsibility, and not on his deterrability, would have any role
in an economic explanation. Thus, economic analysis cannot account for
our criminal category because it simply cannot account for the normative
significance of some of the concepts that are central to it. Finkelstein may
be making even a stronger claim than this. It may be her view that the
mental state of knowledge is central to the very concept of criminality, in
which case the economic analysis would fail not just simply as an account
of our practice, but as a putative account of the very possibility of a crimi-
nal category as such. I do not know if Professor Finkelstein means to make
this stronger claim, or if she does, whether I find the argument persuasive.
The less bold claim, however, seems to me altogether correct, and
Finkelstein's argument for it compelling.
We have, then, at least two arguments that are pretty decisive against
the economic analysis of the criminal law. My argument shows that the
economic analyst's conceptualization of the problem is fundamentally
flawed. The economic account rests on an impoverished, nearly unana-
lyzed, and altogether undeveloped concept of what it is to be a right and
what it means to have rights. It then proceeds to mischaracterize liability
rules as ways of securing rights, while in effect maintaining that liability
rules confer power on non-right holders to violate or "take" rights on the
15. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHhMNT AND RESPONSIBILITY 19 (1968).
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condition that they compensate for doing so. More fundamentally, it mis-
takenly characterizes the system of property, liability, and inalienability
rules as ways of protecting rights, when these rules are best thought of as
norms that help to specify the content of rights. This conceptual morass
leads to a picture of the criminal law as a kind of second-order form of
rights protection: The criminal law protects rights by protecting the trans-
action structure that protects rights more directly. But in fact the criminal
law protects rights directly. Its focus is rights and the rights-structured
normative relations between persons; the focus of the criminal law is not
simply, let alone essentially, the transactional aspects of human interaction.
By contrast, Professor Finkelstein's argument begins with a certain
thesis about the essential nature of the criminal law: Conduct is not subject
to criminal sanction unless an individual knowingly violates one of its
norms. Economic analysis cannot explain the significance of the knowl-
edge requirement. To the extent the knowledge requirement is an essential
feature of our criminal law, economic analysis fails as an account of our
criminal law. To the extent that the knowledge requirement represents an
essential component of criminality as such, economic analysis is incapable
of explaining the very existence of the criminal law category. Though dif-
ferent in these ways, Professor Finkelstein's argument and mine make, at
bottom, the same general point: namely, that on its own terms, the eco-
nomic analysis lacks the resources plausibly to explain the criminal law. If
there is a good argument to the contrary, I have yet to see it.
An economic analysis of the criminal law attempts to explain it in
terms of a certain conception of the law's function. As we have seen, the
function economists ascribe to the criminal law is that of protecting or
securing a transaction structure. Both Professor Finkelstein and I maintain
that this putative function of the criminal law cannot explain basic features
of the criminal category.
Someone convinced by either her objections or mine might think that
where the economist has gone wrong is in ascribing or positing the wrong
function to the criminal law. A better or more apt characterization of its
function would, one might think, successfully illuminate the nature of the
criminal law and of criminality, and would explain the emergence of the
criminal law and the shape it takes in mature legal systems. I cannot speak
for Professor Finkelstein, but in closing I want to say that I am generally
skeptical with regard to functional explanations of the law; it may serve no
function, in the relevant sense.' 6 Rather than seeking out a putative func-
tion, I have argued elsewhere that we can gain useful insight by explaining
16. Of course, in a different sense, the law serves all sorts of functions; the sense in which we are
concerned here is that of a function which can explain the characteristic institutional shape of the law
and of its parts, as well as providing an analysis of the contents of its central organizing concepts and
their relations.
[Vol. 88:921
HeinOnline  -- 88 Cal. L. Rev. 928 2000
CRIMES AND TRANSACTIONS
the law in terms of the concepts embedded in it and their relationship to
one another. This is not a functional explanation, but a conceptual analysis
of the law."
To sketch the method briefly: We begin with the idea that the content
of a concept can be analyzed in terms of the inferential role it plays in the
variety of practices in which it figures. The inferential roles our concepts
play reveal the holistic (or nonatomistic) web of relations in which they
stand to one another, and it is this web that determines a concept's content.
Suppose, for example, that I say to Smith, "I promise to meet you for lunch
today." Understanding this as a promise means knowing that it warrants a
variety of inferences-for example that Smith expects me to show up for
lunch; that I predict I will show up for lunch; that I have a duty to show up;
that Smith has a right that I show up, and so on. The content of the concept
"promise" is revealed in the range of inferences warranted by the belief
that a promise has been made; and to grasp the concept of a promise is to
be able to project the inferences it warrants. 8
In certain kinds of practices, the inferential roles of concepts may be
seen to hang together in a way that reflects a general principle. The princi-
ple can then be said to be embodied in the practice and, at the same time, to
explain it. ' 9 In arguing (as I have) that tort law embodies a principle of cor-
rective justice, for example, I mean that the principle identifies certain
elements of the practice as normatively significant and tells us what that
significance is.2'
My objections to economic analysis-whether of torts or of the crimi-
nal law-do not rest on the claim that any adequate explanation of a legal
practice must take the form of conceptual analysis. Although the economic
analysis of the criminal law is certainly inadequate as an existing body of
theory, it is conceivable that an adequate functional explanation could be
17. The next couple of paragraphs follow the discussion in the first chapter of THE PRAcTICE OF
PRINCIPLE, supra note 14.
18. Two features of the example are noteworthy. First, while some of the inferences are
theoretical, others are practical. Some state predictions; others state responsibilities and rights. The
second noteworthy feature is that the inferences in question are not formal. A formal inference is one
that follows according to rules governing the logical operators. For example, from "I promise," we may
infer formally "I promise, or snow is white." That inference is warranted by the rules governing the
logical operator "or." The inferences in the example, however, are not formal in this sense; they are
grounded not in the rules of logic, but in our grasp of a concept. Some would say that this grasp takes
the form of knowing a large set of formal rules for applying the concept, but this raises daunting
philosophical problems. What we know, in the first instance, is not a set of rules, but simply how to
engage in a variety of practices in which promises are made. This kind of "knowing-how" is not
necessarily reducible to "knowing-that."
19. When the knowledge expressed in such a principle is (in the sense indicated in the previous
note) irreducibly practical, the actual practices themselves are needed to realize, articulate, or make
explicit the principle or principles they embody.
20. It is natural to suppose that we cannot explain a set of concepts in terms that employ any of
the same concepts. Part of the view that explanation can take the form of revealing a kind of
embodiment relationship denies this. For an extended discussion, see COLEMAN, supra note 14.
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developed, in economic or other terms. Such an account would be perfectly
compatible with a conceptual-embodiment explanation of the type I have
sketched. Still, if experience is any indicator, we should not hold our
breath waiting for such a functional account. Having argued at length that
the method of conceptual analysis illuminates central features of our tort
practice, I hope in the future to show how this same approach can deepen
our understanding of the criminal law, as well as of its relationship to torts
and to other parts of the law.
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